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 THE MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT: AVOIDANCE OF 
PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT STATUS AND THE 
RESERVATIONS ON BEHALF OF AUSTRALIA AND THE UK 
MILLA IVANOVA 
This paper will discuss the Permanent Establishment (‘PE’) provisions of the recently signed 
Multilateral Instrument (‘MLI’). Specifically, it will examine the MLI’s adoption of the 
Organisation of Economic Co-Operation and Development (‘OECD’) 2015 Action 7 Final 
Report on Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of PE Status into Articles 12-15. It will then 
proceed to evaluate the potential effectiveness of these Articles in the MLI in light of the 
reservations made by Australia and the UK and the unilateral measures enacted by the two 
countries to combat Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (‘BEPS’). By examining the unilateral 
approach of both nations, this paper aims to highlight that multilateral solutions are essential 
to achieve global coherence and restore confidence in the international tax system.  
I  INTRODUCTION  
The integration of national economies and markets over the last ten years have seen international 
tax issues rise to the top of the political agenda. Weaknesses in the outdated international tax rules, 
which were designed more than a century ago, have created opportunities for base erosion and 
profit shifting and undermined confidence in the international tax system. An OECD study 
commissioned by the G-20 found that some multinationals (‘MNEs’) used strategies that allowed 
them to pay as little as 5% in corporate taxes.1 The study concluded that many of the existing rules 
which protect MNEs from paying double taxation too often allow them to pay no taxes at all, thus 
hurting investment, growth and employment. Although these strategies are technically legal, they 
erode the country tax base and threaten the stability of the international tax system.2 This prompted 
the OECD to release the Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting report in February 2013. This 
report recommended an Action Plan to provide countries with domestic and international 
instruments to better align taxing rights with economic activity.  
In September 2013, the OECD and G-20 counties adopted a 15-point Action Plan to address 
BEPS. After two years of work, these 15 actions formed a BEPS package that represented the first 
substantial renovation of the international tax rules in almost a century. The 15 actions rest on three 
key pillars: introducing coherence in the domestic rules that affect cross-border activities; 
reinforcing substance requirements in the existing international standards; and improving 
transparency and certainty.3 
                                                          
1  OECD, OECD urges stronger international co-operation on corporate tax (12 February 2013) 
<http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/oecd-urges-stronger-international-co-operation-on-corporate-
tax.htm> 
2  Ibid. 
3  OECD (2015), Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status, Action 7 – 2015 
Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, 9. 
  
Five years on, the BEPS project has reached the implementation stage. Since BEPS issues arise 
directly from the existence of loopholes, gaps, frictions or mismatches in the interaction of 
countries’ domestic tax laws, implementation is designed to be effected through changes in 
domestic law and practices and via treaty provisions. Because the adoption of new approaches to 
bilateral tax treaties by way of treaty renegotiations would be burdensome and inefficient, the 
OECD resolved to create a multilateral instrument through Action 15. The implementation of this 
instrument would provide contracting states with a quick method to implement anti-tax avoidance 
measures into their tax treaties.4  
June 2017 marked the signing of the MLI to simultaneously modify over 2,000 treaties to 
implement BEPS minimum standards and best practices. In Australia, the MLI is expected to 
modify 30 of its 44 bilateral tax agreements.5 Since such bilateral treaty networks constitute the core 
of the international tax regime, global dialogue and global solutions regarding the implementation 
of these key changes are imperative to the success of the BEPS project as a whole.   
One of the key areas targeted by the BEPS project and manifested through the multilateral 
instrument is the changes to PE rules. The definition of PE is crucial for determining taxation of a 
non-resident enterprise. Today, it is possible to be heavily involved in the economic life of another 
country without maintaining a physical presence that will amount to the PE definition as it stands. 
In an era where non-resident tax payers can derive significant profits from transactions with 
customers globally, it has become clear that the current PE rules have fallen behind the rapid pace 
of the evolving global economy. The BEPS Report and Action Plan recognised that the definition 
of PE needed to change in order to address BEPS strategies that allow for the artificial avoidance 
of PE. Thus, Action 7 was dedicated to preventing the artificial avoidance of PE status.6  
The Final Report on Action 7 released in 2015 marked the first changes to Articles 5(5) and 5(6) 
of the Model Tax Convention since the OECD Draft in 1963. The publication of the Final Report 
signals an understanding that new ways of doing business have surpassed the need for physical 
presence, thus threatening the PE concept that is so deeply rooted in international tax. Updating 
the concept of PE reflects a response to this threat and attempts to ensure that the creation of a 
taxable presence occurs in the country in which significant economic activity takes place and value 
is created.7  
Despite a global consensus on the importance of ensuring that taxation aligns with value creation, 
the anti-BEPS measures in Action 7 are considered to be only common approaches and best 
practices.8 This means that the contracting states can choose to opt out of the MLI provisions 
covering these actions (specifically, Articles 12-15 covering PE). Australia and the UK have 
published a provisional list of expected reservations and notifications pursuant to Articles 28(7) 
and 29(4) of the MLI. Despite claiming to actively support the work being undertaken by the 
OECD to develop multilateral solutions, of the four Articles addressing Avoidance of PE status, 
                                                          
4  Explanatory Statement, Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, signed 7 June 2017 (entering into force 1 July 2018) 1, 5 (‘MLI 
Explanatory Statement’). 
5  Treasury Laws Amendment (OECD Multilateral Instrument) Bill 2018.  
6  OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD, 2013) 11. 
7  OECD (2015), Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status, Action 7 – 2015 
Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris, 
8  OECD, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, 2015 Final Reports, Frequently Asked Questions 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development <https://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-
frequently-asked-questions.pdf> 
  
Australia has made reservations with respect to three of them.9 The UK has made reservations with 
respect to two of the articles.10 
Given the similarities in unilateral measures undertaken by both countries to address artificial 
avoidance of PEs, these reservations will be discussed in light of the UK and Australian Diverted 
Profits Tax (‘DPT’) and Australia’s Multinational Anti-Avoidance Law (‘MAAL’).  
II  PE FRAMEWORK UNDER THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION 
To understand the importance of the MLI reservations made by Australia and the UK, it is 
worthwhile to observe the development of the PE definition through Article 5 in the Model Tax 
Convention and its subsequent alteration through Action 7. These updates have been incorporated 
into the MLI and it is the reservations to these developed Articles that will be discussed in detail. 
The 2010 Model Tax Convention will be discussed in light of the changes proposed by Action 7 in 
the 2015 Final Report before their implementation in the 2017 Model Tax Convention.  
III  OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION (2010) 
Article 5 of the Model Tax Convention (2010) defines the concept of PE and is crucial to the 
determination of whether the business profits of an enterprise of a contracting state may be taxed 
in the other contracting state.11  
Article 5(1) defines PE as ‘a fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise is 
wholly or partly carried on’. The commentary explains that in order to be ‘fixed’, there has to be a 
link between the place of business and a specific geographical point.12  
Article 5(2) provides a list of PEs, including a) a place of management; b) a branch; c) an office; d) 
a factory; e) a workshop; and f) a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of extraction 
of natural resources.13  
Article 5(3) specifies that a building site or a construction or installation project constitutes a PE 
only if it lasts more than 12 months, providing for a concept of PE based on physical presence of 
foreign investors in source jurisdictions.14  
Article 5(4) provides a list of activity exceptions that do not create PE status, provided they are of 
a preparatory or auxiliary nature to the main business of the taxpayer.15  
To account for investors who carry on a business through an agent and thus avoid the creation of 
a fixed place of business, Article 5(5) specifies that ‘dependent agents’ also constitute a PE. Rather 
than referring to a fixed place, this Article targets the activities carried out by the agent and their 
                                                          
9  Explanatory Memorandum, Treasury Laws Amendment (OECD Multilateral Instrument) Bill 2018, 1.40.  
10  The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Island, Status of List of Reservations and 
Notifications at the Time of Signature, Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related 
Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. 
11  OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital: Commentary on Article 5 para. 2 (2010). 
12  Ibid 94,5. 
13  OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital art 5 (2010). 
14  Ibid. 
15  Ibid. 
  
recurrence, broadening the scope of the link between the business and the specific geographical 
point referred to in the commentary.16  
Finally, Article 5(7) clarifies that carrying on business through a truly independent agent in the 
ordinary course of business will not constitute a PE.17  
IV  ACTION 7 FINAL REPORT PROPOSED CHANGES TO MODEL TAX 
CONVENTION 
The final report on Action 7 was released by the OECD in October 2015, and contained proposed 
changes to dependent agency status, construction PEs, auxiliary and preparatory activity 
exemptions as well as a new anti-fragmentation rule for specific activity exemptions.18 The concept 
of physical presence in the definition of PE in Article 5(1) and (2) has remained unchanged, 
signifying that the target of the Action 7 report is the methods of artificially avoiding PE, rather 
than the PE definition as it stands.  
A  Article 5(4) 
The proposed changes to the specific activity exemptions signify a shift to stronger emphasis on 
the nature of the business carried out. Although the 2014 OECD Model provides the list of 
preparatory or auxiliary activities, proposed amendments in Action 7 reduce the chance of an 
automatic application of the specific activity exemptions. 19  By extending the ‘preparatory or 
auxiliary nature’ requirement to all of the activities listed and not listed in paragraphs a) – f), the 
threshold becomes more restrictive and difficult to achieve. A further development of this Article 
is the emphasis on the determination of the auxiliary or preparatory nature of such activities in light 
of the overall business and activities of the enterprise. 
Although a seemingly minor change, the expansion of the ‘preparatory or auxiliary nature’ 
requirement to all activities conducted by the business highlights that the activities have to be of a 
supportive nature without being a part of the essential activity of the enterprise. When looking at 
the nature of the business as a whole, it is much easier to elect that the activities form an essential 
part of the business in one form or another. This makes it much more difficult to automatically 
apply the exemptions to non-core business activities as they too can be viewed as significant to the 
enterprise as a whole.  
B  Article 5(4)(1) 
Further to the development of Article 5(4), Action 7 proposes the inclusion of a new anti-
fragmentation rule by adding Article 5(4)(1) to the Model Tax Convention. 20 This addition is 
evidently intended to prevent the circumvention of Article 5(4) through the isolation of activities 
and further extends it to segregation of activities through the use of closely-related enterprises. If 
the collective functions of the multinational and its closely related enterprises exceeds the 
                                                          
16  Ibid. 
17  Ibid. 
18  OECD (2015), Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status, Action 7 – 2015 
Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241220-en> 
19  Ibid, 28. 
20  Ibid, 39. 
  
preparatory or auxiliary threshold, it will not be eligible for the specific activity exemptions under 
Article 5(4). This addition acts as a supporting pillar for Article 5(4) because it joins the functions 
of all the separate entities where preparatory or auxiliary functions are carried on and examines 
them collectively. The application of this new rule makes it harder to prove that the activities are 
not significant to the enterprise as a whole, particularly when viewed together. The implementation 
of this rule as well as the broadening of the preparatory and auxiliary requirement in Article 5(4) 
amplifies the difficulty in obtaining a specific activity exemption and removes its automatic 
application.  
C  Articles 5(5) and 5(6) 
Perhaps the most significant amendments in the Action 7 Report are those targeting Articles 5(5) 
and (6).21 Since PE operates as a determinative threshold for source taxation, developing rules to 
account for agents operating in source states to avoid creating an economic presence is crucial. 
Without the development of these Articles, entities can leverage loopholes in PE definitions by 
appointing representatives to act on their behalf without falling under any provisions in the 
respective double taxation agreements.  
The additions of Articles 5(5)(b) and (c) negate such abuses by extending the existence of PE to 
contracts concluded by the commissionaire in the commissionaire’s name rather than just in the 
name of the enterprise.22  This considerably broadens the scope of the agency PE.  
To understand the significance of this change, it is important to note the differences in the 
interpretation of agency in civil vs common law countries. Since tax treaties are bilateral agreements, 
they are governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969.23 However, the term 
‘agency’ is a non-tax concept, and is therefore viewed in light of the domestic laws of the states that 
are party to the treaty.  
Civil law countries have a clear division in direct and indirect agency representation, with indirect 
representation being incapable of binding a principal to the agreement, as the contract is not 
concluded in the name of the enterprise directly.24 In common law countries, the acting of an 
intermediary on behalf of a foreign enterprise will bind that enterprise whether they are acting 
directly or indirectly. This fundamental mismatch between the binding capabilities of an agent 
makes it open to exploitation by enterprises. Adopting a strictly civil law approach, it can be argued 
that no PE is created because the commissionaire is incapable of binding the enterprise when 
concluding contracts on its own behalf. Thus, the independent agent exception would apply and 
no agency relationship would be established. The extension of Article 5(5) to include (5)(b) and 
(5)(c) aligns the interpretation of agency to include direct and indirect representation, thus making 
it harder to exploit the mismatch.  
The new definition of independent agents in Article 5(6) adopts a substance over form approach 
by looking at the exclusivity with which the person acts for the enterprise. This approach makes it 
more difficult to qualify for the independent agent exception. It also introduces the definition of a 
‘closely relate enterprise’ in Article 5(6)(b) by providing a subjective test (‘based on all the relevant 
                                                          
21  Ibid, 15, 8. 
22  Ibid, 16. 
23  David Feuerstein, ‘The Agency Permanent Establishment’ in Series on International Tax Law: Permanent 
Establishments in International and EU Tax Law (Linde Verlag Wien, 2011) 107. 
24  Ibid, 109. 
  
facts and circumstances’) and an objective test (‘possesses directly or indirectly more than 50% of 
the beneficial interest in the other’).25 This places the spotlight on local subsidiaries that act for 
foreign enterprises, particularly widening the scope to include intermediaries that sell the operations 
of the parent company but get remunerated on a percentage margin. The commentary on Article 
5(6) provides that if 10% of all sales concluded by the agent relate to the enterprise, this is enough 
to determine that they are not an independent agent.26  This is a very low threshold that most 
subsidiaries will fall into, making it more difficult to obtain the independent agent exception.  
D  Article 5(3) 
Although there have been no amendments specifically proposed to Article 5(3), the OECD aims 
to address the problem of splitting up contracts by introducing a Principal Purpose Test. New 
example commentary has been proposed to demonstrate the operation of the Principal Purpose 
Test to determine whether the objective of dividing the contracts was to obtain the Article 5(3) 
exception.27 Additionally, the cumulative period of the split-up contracts will be considered when 
determining the application of the 12-month threshold.28 This evidently aims to close the gap that 
allows for the circumvention of PE status by dividing up the periods of construction contracts to 
fall below the 12-month period.  
V  MLI ADOPTION OF ACTION 7 
The proposed changes contained in Action 7 are addressed in Articles 12-15 of the MLI. Updates 
to Articles 5(5) and (6) are addressed in Article 12 of the MLI; Article 5(4) is addressed in Article 
13 of the MLI; Article 5(3) is addressed in Article 14 of the MLI and the definition of closely related 
enterprises covered in Article 5(6)(b) is addressed in Article 15 of the MLI. The language used in 
the MLI differs from that in Action 7 to allow for a wider variety of existing treaties to be covered 
multilaterally without increasing difficulty in implementation.29 However, this is not intended to 
substantively change the provisions in the Model Tax Convention.  
VI  RESERVATIONS 
Although each country that is a party to the MLI must implement the measures contained in Action 
6 and Action 14 as minimum standards, they have the choice to opt out of Action 2 and Action 7 
provisions, as they are considered to be common approaches and best practices.30  
Australia has specified the ‘Covered Tax Agreements’ which it wishes to include within the scope 
of the MLI. It has reserved for the entirety of Article 12 (‘Artificial Avoidance of PE Status Through 
Commissionaire Arrangements and Similar Strategies’) and Article 13 (‘Artificial Avoidance of PE 
Status through the Specific Activity Exemptions’) not to apply to its Covered Tax Agreements. It 
                                                          
25  OECD (2015), Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status, Action 7 – 2015 
Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
26  Ibid, 26, 38.8 
27  Ibid, 42 
28  Ibid, 43, 18.1 
29  MLI Explanatory Statement, above n 4, 1, 5. 
30  OECD, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, 2015 Final Reports, Frequently Asked Questions 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development <https://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-
frequently-asked-questions.pdf> 
  
has also made a reservation on Article 14 (‘Splitting up of Contracts’) not to apply to Covered Tax 
Agreements relating to the exploration for or exploitation of natural resources. Australia has since 
stated that the reason for the reservations was concern about how the language will be interpreted, 
as there is no consensus on PE policy.31 
The UK has reserved for the entirety of Articles 12 and 14 not to apply to its Covered Tax 
Agreements. Notably, only 12 of the 78 signatories to the MLI elected to accept all of the BEPS 
PE reforms, revealing that tax competitiveness is a consideration for BEPS signatories in choosing 
which changes to adopt. This indicates that much more work is required to build a strong level of 
consensus amongst BEPS nations.   
VII  UNILATERAL MEASURES 
The overarching assumption as to the reservations made by Australia and the UK is that the 
expansion of Action 7 into the MLI results in increased source taxation, given the broadening of 
the agency definition, commissionaire arrangements and splitting up of contracts. The 
implementation of the MLI is arguably a measure in a long process of treaty advancement that aims 
to reduce source tax revenue losses associated with modern tax treaties.32 Therefore, opting out of 
the PE MLI provisions (particularly agency clauses) means that these reforms will not apply to 
outbound PEs of Australian or UK residents in treaty partners, and the unilateral measures, being 
strictly inbound, will apply to all inbound scenarios. This means Australia and the UK can optimise 
taxation within their jurisdictions while eliminating the need to concede taxing rights to treaty 
partners.   
Carol Doran Klein of the US Council for International Business voiced concern that ‘to the extent 
countries pursue unilateral actions like Australia’s MAAL and DPT and back away from the 
multilateral BEPS agreement, more conflicts will be created without satisfactory avenues to 
resolution’.33 Although Australia and the UK have actively supported the BEPS initiative, the 
unilateral actions pursued by both countries appear to deviate from the path to global coherence.   
A  UK’s Diverted Profits Tax 
The Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (‘HMRC’) has expressed that the DPT aims to deter and 
counteract the diversion of profits from the UK by large groups that either seek to avoid creating 
a UK PE that would bring a foreign company into the charge to UK Corporation Tax; or use 
arrangements or entities which lack economic substance to exploit tax mismatches either through 
expenditure or the diversion of income within the group.34  
The DPT is charged at a rate of 25% of diverted profits relating to UK activity. Broadly, it is 
designed to address transactions which, in the opinion of HMRC lack economic substance as well 
as contrived arrangements which avoid a UK PE. Where an arrangement is deemed to be so 
contrived, a charge to tax is applied upon the profits that would otherwise be chargeable to UK 
                                                          
31 Amanda Athanasiou, Tax Officials Explain BEPS Reservations (12 March 2018) Tax Notes 
<https://www.taxnotes.com/worldwide-tax-daily/base-erosion-and-profit-shifting-beps/tax-officials-
explain-beps-reservations/2018/03/12/26ysq>  
32  Johann Hattingh, ‘The Impact of the BEPS Multilateral Instrument on International Tax Policies’ 
(April/May 2018) Bulletin for International Taxation 234, 3.5.  
33  Athanasiou, above n, 28. 
34  HM Revenue & Customs, Diverted Profits Tax: Guidance (30 November 2015), 4. 
  
Corporation Tax but for the existence of the contrived arrangement. This tax becomes chargeable 
when four conditions are met: the participation condition; the mismatch condition; the tax 
avoidance condition; and the no economic substance condition. 35 
It is important to note that the DPT is not considered by the HMRC as a corporation tax, but 
rather a tax in its own right. It therefore has its own rules for notification, assessment and payment. 
The HMRC also argues that is thereby outside the scope of the UK’s Double Tax Treaties.  
Further, there are two parts to the DPT nexus: the avoided permanent establishment (a qualitative 
standard) and a turnover threshold (the quantitative standard).36 The ‘avoided PE’ is deemed to 
exist where an enterprise that that is a non-resident in the UK carries on a trade and that enterprise 
‘whether or not UK resident, is carrying on activity in the UK in that period in connection with 
supplies of services, goods or other property made by the foreign company in the course of that 
trade…’ and that it is ‘…reasonable to assume that any of the activity of the avoided PE or the 
foreign company (or both) is designed as to ensure that the foreign company does not, as a result 
of the avoided PE’s activity, carry on that trade in the UK for the purposes of corporation tax.’37 
The concept of ‘avoided PE’ appears to be an attempt at creating a unilateral supplement to the 
existing PE standard without directly modifying the PE definition as it stands. It is therefore unclear 
how this can operate in conjunction with the UK’s treaty obligations which conform to the current 
PE definition. It is further unclear how this can operate within the context of the MLI, which has 
implemented the PE changes outlined in the Action 7 Report. What is clear, however, is that the 
reservations made by the UK coincide with the development of the DPT. This substantiates Carol 
Doran Klein’s concerns about the creation of conflicts without satisfactory avenues to resolution, 
as companies who find themselves within the scope of the UK DPT cannot seek relief from treaty 
partners since it appears to override UK treaty obligations. If the MLI’s purpose is to prevent 
source tax revenue losses associated with tax treaties, then it follows that when observed in light of 
the UK DPT, the MLI will not realise this goal. Rather, more double taxation will occur with no 
multilateral recourse.  
B  Australia’s Diverted Profits Tax 
Shortly after the UK’s implementation of the DPT, Australia followed suit by legislating their own 
DPT. Although initially modelled on the UK DPT, the tax eventually took a form of its own and 
became significantly more punitive in its nature. Imposed at a rate of 40%, the DPT ‘aims to ensure 
that the tax paid by significant global entities (‘SGEs’) properly reflects the economic substance of 
their activities in Australia and aims to prevent the diversion of profits offshore through 
arrangements involving related parties.’38 
Broadly, the DPT will apply to a scheme if a SGE has obtained a DPT tax benefit in connection 
with the scheme; and it would be concluded that the person who entered into or carried out the 
scheme did so for a principal purpose of, or for more than one principal purpose of: enabling the 
                                                          
35  Finance Act 2015 (UK) c 11, ss 86(2), 107,108,110 (‘Finance Act’) 
36  Stuart MacLennan, ‘The Questionable Legality of the Diverted Profits Tax Under Double Taxation 
Conventions and EU Law’ (2016) vol 44, no 12, Intertax, 903-912. 
37  Finance Act s 86(1). 
38  Australian Taxation Office, Diverted Profits Tax (19 February 2018) Australian Government, Australian 
Taxation Office <https://www.ato.gov.au/general/new-legislation/in-detail/direct-taxes/income-tax-
for-businesses/diverted-profits-tax/?=redirected> 
  
SGE to obtain a tax benefit or both to obtain a tax benefit and reduce a foreign tax liability or 
enabling the SGE and another taxpayer to obtain a tax benefit and reduce a foreign tax liability.39 
The DPT will not apply if the taxpayer meets one of the three exceptions: the assessable income in 
question does not exceed $25 million; the increase in foreign tax liabilities of the entity resulting 
from the scheme is 80% or more of the reduction in Australian tax liability; or the profit made 
from the scheme reasonably reflects the economic substance of the entity’s activities in connection 
with the scheme. 40 
The punitive nature of this DPT does not only come in the form of a substantial 40% penalty tax 
rate. Perhaps the more punishing element of the tax is the requirement for the taxpayer to pay the 
penalty within 21 days before being able to ask for a review.41 During the period of review, which 
lasts 12 months, the taxpayer is able to provide information to the Commissioner that supports 
why the DPT assessment should be reduced.42 If the taxpayer is dissatisfied with the assessment at 
the end of the review, they have 60 days to challenge this in the Federal Court. However, the 
taxpayer will be restricted to the evidence that was provided to the Commissioner during the period 
of review. No further information will be allowed into evidence.43 
Although international tax treaties override Australia’s domestic tax law pursuant to the 
International Tax Agreements Act 1953, the act makes an exception for Part IVA of the Income 
Tax Assessment Act 1936 to prevail over Australia’s tax treaties. Therefore, unlike the HMRC, the 
Australian Taxation Office does not need to argue that the DPT is not an income tax. By inserting 
the DPT into Part IVA, it will have prevalence over Australia’s double tax treaty obligations. 
Similarly to the UK, companies that find themselves within the scope of the Australian DPT will 
be unable to seek relief from treaty partners as Part IVA trumps Australia’s treaty obligations.  
C  Australia’s MAAL 
Australia’s MAAL and DPT cumulatively target the two areas that are covered by the UK DPT. 
Whilst the DPT covers schemes that lack economic substance (the second limb of the UK DPT); 
the MAAL targets the avoidance of permanent establishment in Australia (the first limb of the UK 
DPT). Its purpose is to prevent MNEs who sell to Australian customers from using artificial 
arrangements in order to avoid paying tax in Australia. 44  Any MNEs found to be avoiding 
Australian tax under the MAAL will be required to pay back the tax owed, plus interest, and face 
penalties of up to 100% of the tax owed.  
The introduction of the MAAL was the first significant step in Australia’s departure from the 
multilateral solutions proposed by the OECD. Although the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill 
highlights Australia’s understanding of the importance of OECD work, it also points out that more 
immediate action is required unilaterally. To this end, the MAAL introduced the term ‘SGE’ to 
which the law will apply. The SGEs targeted will be those that avoid a taxable presence by 
undertaking significant work in Australia in direct connection to Australian sales but booking their 
                                                          
39  Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Treasury Laws Amendment (Combating Multinational Tax 
Avoidance) Bill 2017, Diverted Profits Tax Bill 2017, 9, 1.11. 
40  Ibid, 10 
41  Ibid, 1.13. 
42  Ibid, 1.15. 
43  Ibid. 
44  Explanatory Memorandum, Tax Laws Amendment (Combating Multinational Tax Avoidance) Bill 2015, 
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revenue offshore; and have a principal purpose of avoiding tax in Australia or reducing their foreign 
tax liability.45 Further, the MAAL involves a lower threshold to be met of ‘one or more of the 
principal purposes’ which can bring more arrangements within its scope.   
The MAAL also introduced the concept of a ‘notional PE’, allowing the Australian Taxation Office 
(‘ATO’) to redefine the taxable income attributable to a PE that would have existed.46 Where a 
scheme is captured by the MAAL, the Commissioner can make a determination based on a 
reasonable alternative postulate.47 This means that the Commissioner will provide a theory as to 
what the SGE could have done instead of their current arrangement. The Commissioner can then 
issue a tax assessment reflecting the entity having an Australian PE.  
It is difficult to conceive how a determination by the ATO could be representational of the 
economic reality in which SGEs operate. This is particularly so given the level of subjectivity 
involved in making this determination. If the ATO makes a reasonable theory as to what the SGE 
should have done, this leaves scope for other countries to make the same ‘reasonable theory’ to 
claim their share of tax. An attempt by the ATO to act both as an executor of the law and an 
arbitrator as to the economic decisions that should have been made by a multinational company 
seems like a far-reaching role with very few restrictions in place to hold it back. The impact of this 
will be felt the most by SGEs due to the lack of multilateral recourse available when such a 
determination is made. 
Further, the proposal to toughen the MAAL to include foreign trusts and partnerships suggests 
that the government continues to see unilateral action as the solution to avoidance of PEs.48 The 
2018-19 budget saw the government announce the broadening of the SGE definition to include 
members of large multinational groups headed by private companies, trusts and partnerships, as 
well as members of groups headed by investment entities.49 This will further broaden the scope for 
the application of the MAAL and the DPT.  
There is a clear dichotomy between the public and private sector as to what constitutes a ‘fair share 
of tax’.50 As a country that is rich in resources and reliant on capital investment, it is important to 
maintain a consistent and firm approach towards taxing companies that operate within the country. 
However, it is important to remember that multilateral solutions are more favourable to Australia 
because they allow the taxpayers a right of recourse and a way to manage disputes. This presence 
of certainty removes disincentive to operate in Australia. A unilateral path is immediate and 
effective in the short term, however its long-term consequences could see Australia lose its appeal 
as a country of operation because the impact of the MAAL and the DPT leave very little 
opportunity for SGEs to obtain assurance about their operations.  
This sentiment has been echoed by Professor Richard Vann, who summarised that the DPT and 
the MAAL are a manifestation of Australia ‘breaking out’ from international consensus. During the 
committee hearings in the Senate Economics Committee Inquiry into Corporate Tax Avoidance, 
he quoted “…the diverted profits tax would be seen, I think, by many countries as going beyond 
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the consensus on transfer pricing. We are taking money which, under the consensus, does not 
belong to us”.51 
One of the primary appeals of implementing unilateral legislation like the MAAL and the DPT is 
the effect of discouraging MNEs from creating structures that assist tax avoidance in the first place. 
However, in instances where tax avoidance is not the primary purpose, the issue of PEs can be 
addressed through the MLI. For instance, the concept of a ‘notional PE’ has similarities with the 
dependent agent provisions of Action 7, which have been incorporated into the MLI. Further, the 
changes to article 5(6) in Action 7 that define an independent agent to be ‘acting exclusively or 
almost exclusively on behalf of one or more enterprises to which it is closely related’ are mirrored 
in the MAAL.  
VIII  COMPATIBILITY WITH TREATY OBLIGATIONS 
A  MAAL Compatibility with Australia’s Treaty Obligations 
The MAAL is a unilateral measure that applies to inbound scenarios only. This raises the question 
of compatibility with Article 24(3) of the Model Tax Convention.52 Technically, there is no valid 
inconsistency between the MAAL and Article 24, because the MAAL has been inserted into Part 
IVA and thus trumps Australia’s treaty obligations. Nonetheless, the rationale supporting the 
existence of Article 24(3) is clear – to prevent PEs from being taxed less favourably in Australia 
than an Australian PE would be taxed in the contracting state. The MAAL directly contravenes this 
standard by taxing PEs less favourably and applying only to inbound scenarios. Australia’s disregard 
for this Article in acting unilaterally questions its commitment to international consensus. 
Importantly, it compromises the broad trajectory of global tax reform.  
B  UK DPT Compatibility with Double Tax Conventions and EU Law 
Although the HMRC takes a different view, it is difficult not to question whether its DPT is 
compatible with the UK’s double tax conventions.  
There are two potential entry conditions to the DPT. The first one is the mismatch condition, 
whereby the DPT will apply if a reduction of profits in the avoided PE is not matched by an increase 
in profits of the corresponding party.53 The second condition is the tax avoidance purpose. In the 
first scenario, the charge to tax will apply where the mismatch has occurred. Notably, in the second 
scenario, there is no mention of a tax mismatch. The charge to tax will apply merely where the 
purpose of the arrangement is to avoid a charge to UK corporation tax.54 This scenario is thus 
considered by reference to purpose rather than fact, which is not provided for in any of the UK’s 
DTAs or the OECD Model Tax Convention.55 Therefore, the consideration of purpose is entirely 
in the hands of the HMRC and cannot be relieved through a DTA. If there is no necessity for a tax 
mismatch to occur to trigger this entry condition, what facts will be relied on to show that a tax 
avoidance purpose exists?  Does the mere fact that a company establishes a subsidiary in another 
country trigger a presumption of tax avoidance?  
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Another interesting argument is the UK’s compliance with EU Law, namely, the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’).56 Article 110 TFEU provides that no member state 
shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of other Members States any internal taxation 
of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on similar products.57 Stuart MacLennan 
of the China-EU School of Law argues that of further relevance to corporations is the provision 
of Article 49 TFEU, which prohibits restrictions upon freedom of establishment of nationals of 
Members States in the territory of another Member State. Included in this is the establishment and 
management of undertakings, including companies. 58  Article 63 also provides for the free 
movement of capital within the Union.59  
The very nature of the DPT is such that it can only be imposed on a non-resident company. 
Considering that the freedom of movement was established to ensure that resources are allocated 
to their most efficient location, it would follow that measures which restrict selection of the most 
favourable environments to place those resources in goes against Article 63. To this end, Stuart 
MacLennan draws on examples from EU case law (Cadbury Schweppes)60  to highlight that the 
freedom of establishment guaranteed by the EU Treaties means that the fact that an enterprise has 
sought to establish itself in a Member State in order to take advantage of a more favourable 
legislative environment does not constitute an abuse of that freedom. He also relies on the opinion 
of Advocate General Leger in Sandoz 61 who took the view that ‘the principle of the free movement 
of capital was introduced inter alia in order to enable Community nationals to enjoy the most 
favourable conditions for investing their capital available to them in any of the States which make 
up the Community.’62  
It would then follow that by virtue of Article 63, an SGE cannot be punished if it is merely utilising 
the tax advantages that are legally provided by another country. This makes the implementation of 
the UK DPT trickier on a unilateral level. On the one hand, it is objectively possible to establish 
that a mismatch condition has been satisfied. On the other hand, arguing that a tax avoidance 
motive exists merely because another country has tax incentives in place goes against the purpose 
of the TFEU.  
With the UK’s pending exit from the EU, the application of the TFEU in the UK could become 
obsolete. The European Communities Act 1972 is the most important piece of legislation for the 
UK to repeal to end the constitutional relationship between the UK and EU. This is because the 
act provides for supremacy of EU law in the UK.63 If this act is repealed, the freedoms under the 
TFEU will no longer apply and thus the legality of the DPT under EU law will not be in question. 
However, the overarching intention behind the creation of the TFEU remains - to encourage 
favourable trading relations between the EU countries. Despite a looming Brexit, the UK’s 
intention to maintain favourable trade terms with the EU is undisputed. This will be difficult to 
achieve once it leaves the EU, so it is important for the UK to consider the practicality of its 
unilateral DPT model if it wants to establish strong bilateral trade ties with other nations globally.  
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It has been reported that the UK Labour Party has called on the government to boost the 
enforcement of the DPT after reduced DPT revenue estimates showed the HMRC failed to 
adequately enforce the tax. Her Majesty’s Treasury disputed the claims, noting that the numbers 
referenced do not include the estimates of revenue raised from companies changing their behaviour 
because of the DPT.64 This suggests that so far, the true purpose of the UK DPT has been to act 
as a tool to influence taxpayer behaviour, rather than an enforcement tool. This perhaps re-affirms 
that a multilateral solution would be more effective in its implementation and enforcement as it 
aligns with international treaty commitments and provides for an opportunity to take up disputes 
through arbitration.   
IX  RESERVATIONS AS TO PART VI ARBITRATION 
It is unsurprising that Australia made a reservation to exclude Part IVA from Part VI Arbitration 
Articles in the MLI.65 The UK has made no such reservation, however has argued that the DPT is 
not an income tax and therefore falls outside the scope of its double tax agreements. Including 
these unilateral measures within the scope of Mandatory Binding Arbitration in the MLI would at 
least allow SGEs some recourse as to the application of the UK DPT and Australia’s DPT and 
MAAL.  
The impact of Australia’s reservations to the MLI can already be seen in Japan’s objections to these 
reservations.66 The impact of this is that the entirety of Part VI will be excluded from the Australia-
Japan treaty.67 Japan is Australia’s third biggest trading partner, and an objection of this sort 
signifies the country’s frustration with Australia’s position hindering international cooperation.  
Ultimately, this begs the question: if countries like the UK and Australia choose to diverge from 
international consensus, and countries like Japan object to entering into the MLI with those 
countries, will this set off a chain reaction and thus prevent the MLI from becoming the landmark 
instrument it was designed to be? If the biggest proponents of BEPS and the MLI are taking their 
own path, it is worth questioning whether it will implode from within and discourage tax 
cooperation on an international level.  
X  CONCLUSION 
It is still early days to conclusively evaluate the impact of the MLI. However, the position of the 
parties to the MLI provides some context as to how strong of an impact it could make in the future. 
Although the MLI is intended to be a landmark instrument that is fundamental to propelling the 
fight against BEPS, its chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Although the development of the 
PE definition to account for the rapidly changing and integrated national economies is a sign of 
progress, unilateral action and supplementary PE interpretations show a sign of retreat. An effective 
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operation of the MLI requires international cooperation, and the current status of reservations 
shows there is still work to be done. 
 
